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We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi-
ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need
to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the
competitive equilibrium is typically ineﬃcient.
We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs
can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs
with additional funds, eﬃciency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of
these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does
not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain
eﬃciency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets
for monitored loans.
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Imagine a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow resources to undertake an investment
project. Some entrepreneurs have good projects that succeed often, but others have bad projects
that succeed only seldom. Imagine also that the quality of each investment project is private
information, known to the corresponding entrepreneur but unobservable to outsiders. This is the
typical situation that gives rise to adverse selection in ﬁnancial markets: if there is a single market
interest rate at which resources can be borrowed, entrepreneurs with bad projects — which are the
ones most likely to fail, and hence to default — will be over-represented in the pool of borrowers.
Of course, borrowing in the real world is subject to lending standards that extend beyond
the interest rate. And it has long been understood that, by providing borrowers with incentives
to self-select, these standards play a useful role in mitigating adverse selection. In our speciﬁc
setting, for example, lending standards might include the share of total investment that a borrower
must ﬁnance with his own resources. In a competitive equilibrium, entrepreneurs with good projects
(“good entrepreneurs”) might then choose to borrow at a low interest rate even if this requires them
to invest their own resources in the project. Entrepreneurs with bad projects (“bad entrepreneurs”),
which are more likely to fail, might instead choose to borrow at a high interest rate in order to avoid
such a requirement. Clearly, these lending standards are only meaningful if they can be enforced
by lenders, which in turn requires entrepreneurial borrowing and investment to be susceptible of
monitoring. Thus, models of adverse selection commonly assume some form of monitored lending.
Despite the useful role of monitored lending, conventional wisdom suggests that competitive
equilibria like the one just described are typically ineﬃcient. The reason for this is intuitive.
Diﬀerent types of borrowers will only self-select into diﬀerent lending standards if the type of loan
chosen by good entrepreneurs is not attractive to bad entrepreneurs. This is similar to saying
that the latter impose an externality on the former by limiting, through an incentive compatibility
constraint, the types of loans that they can access in equilibrium.
Why can this externality not be internalized in a competitive equilibrium? After all, economists
have long known that externalities can be dealt with by trading in the appropriate markets. In
our economy, the government could be the one to create such a market. It could, for example,
create and distribute a stock of “borrowing rights” among entrepreneurs and require them to give
up these rights to borrow at a low interest rate. This would immediately provide entrepreneurs
with incentives to trade these rights. Good entrepreneurs — who have a higher return to investment
1— would tend to demand these rights, whereas bad entrepreneurs would tend to supply them. If
optimally tailored, these trades would induce bad entrepreneurs to internalize the externality that
they impose, eﬀectively solving the ineﬃciency associated to adverse selection. Of course, in order
for it to work eﬀectively, this scheme requires the intervention of an informed government to create
the borrowing rights, instrument their use and distribute exactly the required amount throughout
the population.
Conventional wisdom suggests that, however diﬃcult, such an intervention is necessary because
market participants are unable to attain eﬃciency on their own. To see this, consider that lenders
try to deal with the externality by modifying the terms of their loans. They could do so by collecting
fees from entrepreneurs that borrow through low-interest rate loans and distributing the proceeds
among entrepreneurs that borrow through high-interest rate loans. This would discourage bad
entrepreneurs from behaving like good ones, essentially leading them to internalize the externality
that they impose. Such an arrangement, however, cannot be part of a competitive equilibrium.
The reason is simple: it simultaneously requires diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs to borrow at
diﬀerent terms and good entrepreneurs to make transfers to bad ones. This implies that lenders
make positive expected proﬁts on loans extended to good entrepreneurs and they make negative
expected proﬁts on loans extended to bad entrepreneurs. But clearly no lender has an incentive
to extend loans that make losses in expectation, which makes it impossible to decentralize this
allocation as a competitive equilibrium. It is thus commonly thought that, when left to their own
devices, markets will lead to ineﬃcient outcomes.
In this paper, we argue that the conventional wisdom for this class of environments rests on one
implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is
introduced, in which entrepreneurs can obtain additional funds, we show that the eﬃcient allocation
is an equilibrium of the economy. Paradoxically, an important characteristic of these additional
markets is that — contrary to what is commonly assumed in environments of adverse selection — the
loans that they extend must be unmonitored, in the sense that they do not condition entrepreneurial
borrowing or investment in any way. We therefore refer to these markets as “unmonitored markets”,
and to the loans that they extend as “unmonitored loans”.
The intuition for our main result is the following: if good entrepreneurs can access monitored
loans at more favorable terms by investing their own resources in the project, it might be beneﬁcial
for them to raise more resources through unmonitored loans. Of course, precisely because these
loans are unmonitored, doing so is costly. If good entrepreneurs borrow from them, bad entrepre-
2neurs have an incentive to also do so in order to beneﬁt from the ensuing cross-subsidization. Good
entrepreneurs, then, face a trade-oﬀ: borrowing from unmonitored markets is directly costly be-
cause it entails cross-subsidization of bad borrowers, but it is indirectly beneﬁcial because it allows
them to raise resources that can be used to relax the incentive compatibility constraint in monitored
markets. We show that there is an equilibrium of our economy in which this trade-oﬀ is exploited
optimally to attain the eﬃcient levels of investment. In such an equilibrium, there is pooling of all
entrepreneurs in the unmonitored markets and separation of diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs in the
monitored markets.
How can this unmonitored lending be eﬃciency enhancing? A useful interpretation of the
role of unmonitored loans is that they allow good entrepreneurs to “buy” an eﬃcient screening
technology. In our environment, good entrepreneurs can be screened by distorting their investment
or by investing more of their own resources in the project: of the two, the latter is costless whereas
the former is not. If the initial problem is one of scarcity of the resource that allows for eﬃcient
screening, an additional set of markets thus helps by allowing good entrepreneurs to “purchase”
more of it. In order for it to be eﬀective, however, this purchase must not condition entrepreneurial
investment. Otherwise, good entrepreneurs would always have an incentive to separate themselves
by purchasing these resources in markets that require them to be invested, eﬀectively taking us
back to the original economy. In this sense, and contrary to common results in environments of
asymmetric information, welfare is enhanced by enabling entrepreneurs to engage in unmonitored
trades.
This paper is closely related to the literature that studies the eﬃciency properties of competitive
equilibria under adverse selection. In particular, Rustichini and Siconolﬁ (2003, 2004) and Bisin and
Gottardi (2006) have posed the problem generated by adverse selections in terms of consumption
externalities arising from the incentive compatibility constraint. Bisin and Gottardi have also
proposed a particular mechanism to deal with it, which mirrors the general prescription for a
government intervention that we described above. If the problem is one of externalities, they say,
it can be solved by introducing markets that allow agents to internalize them. Their mechanism
requires the introduction of consumption rights for each type of agent. In the context of our model,
this can be translated as follows: if an entrepreneur wants to borrow subject to the standards
available for good borrowers, he must provide a certain amount of “good” borrower rights. If these
rights are initially distributed among the population in the appropriate manner, and if markets
are created in which these rights can be traded, Bisin and Gottardi show that eﬃciency can be
3attained in equilibrium. The present paper diﬀers from their work in two dimensions. On the one
hand, our result is admittedly less general because the analysis is restricted to problems of adverse
selection in credit markets. On the other hand, though, we show how eﬃciency can be attained in
such a setting through the use of simple competitive markets, without the need of intervention by
a central planner to setup and manage a complicated mechanism.
In its modeling of perfect competition under adverse selection our paper draws heavily on Dubey
and Geanakoplos (2002), who recast the classic model of insurance of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
in an environment of competitive pooling.1 In its modeling of the particular form of asymmetric
information in a production economy our paper draws mostly from Martin (2009), which is in turn
closely related to the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Bester (1985, 1987). A key diﬀerence
between our setting and most of those analyzed by the previous literature is that we allow for a
concave investment function, so that the size of projects is determined endogenously in equilibrium.2
This feature is crucial since it allows entrepreneurs to be screened both through the total level of
investment that they undertake and the amount of their own resources that they invest in the
project.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model of the credit market
with monitored lending and characterizes its equilibria. Section 3 introduces unmonitored lending
and studies how this aﬀects the set of equilibria of the economy. Section 4 analyzes the constrained
optimal allocation that would be implemented by a central planner and compares it to the equilibria
attainable with unmonitored lending. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 Setup
Assume an economy that is populated by a continuum of individuals with mass one, indexed by
 ∈ . A fraction 1 of the population is composed of entrepreneurs, while the remaining fraction
1 −  is composed of savers. We use  and  to respectively denote the set of entrepreneurs and
savers in the economy, so that  ∪  = . There are two periods indexed by  ∈ {01},t h a tw e
refer to as Today and Tomorrow. Entrepreneurs and savers are respectively endowed with  and
1More recently, Guerrieri et al. (2010) study existence and optimality of equilibria in economies of adverse selection
in the presence of search frictions.
2In this regard, our environment is closest to the one analyzed by Besanko and Thakor (1987).
4 units of the economy’s only consumption good Today, but they care only about their expected
consumption Tomorrow, i.e. if 1 denotes individual ’s consumption Tomorrow, his utility function
Today is given by 0 = 0 {1}. We assume throughout that  ·  +( 1− ) ·  = , so that the
economy’s total endowment is constant. The economic problem that we are considering, then, is
that of transforming this initial endowment into consumption Tomorrow in the most eﬃcient way.
To do so, agents in our economy have two options. They may use a storage technology that
yields one unit of the consumption good Tomorrow for every unit stored Today. Alternatively, they
may use a productive technology that produces Tomorrow’s good by using Today’s good as an input.
We will make assumptions so that it is always beneﬁcial for the economy to simultaneously use the
storage and production technologies. The latter, th o u g h ,c a nb eo p e r a t e ds o l e l yb ye n t r e p r e n e u r s
and it may be subject to informational frictions. The reason, of course, is that entrepreneurs might
diﬀer according to their productivity.
In particular, we assume that entrepreneurs may be either of type  (“Bad”) or  (“Good”)
depending on the productivity of their technology. Entrepreneurs of each type are distributed over
intervals of length ,  ∈ {},w h e r e +  = .W e u s e 

 to denote the set of type
 entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur of type  has a successful (unsuccessful) state Tomorrow with
probability  (1−), where   . If successful (unsuccessful), an entrepreneur of type  that
invests  units of the consumption good Today obtains a gross return of () (zero) Tomorrow. It is






to denote the average probability of success among all entrepreneurs in the economy.
We focus on the case in which ·0()  1, so that the optimal investment of all entrepreneurs
exceeds their endowment and there is scope for all of them to borrow. Throughout, we use ∗∗
to
denote the ﬁrst-best level of investment of entrepreneurs of type  ∈ {} when the gross-interest
rate equals one, i.e. the level of investment that satisﬁes  · 0(∗∗
)=1 . We also assume that
 · max  ,( 1 )
where max, which we will deﬁne precisely later on, denotes the maximum level of investment
undertaken by entrepreneurs in equilibrium when the gross interest rate equals one. Equation (1)
thus guarantees that storage is always used in equilibrium and it simpliﬁes the analysis by ﬁxing
the equilibrium interest rates in credit markets.3
3Clearly, Equation (1) can always be satisﬁed by making  suﬃciently small.
5We assume throughout that entrepreneurial types are private information and thus unobservable
to lenders. This implies that the contracts used to intermediate credit can only be contingent on
whether a project is successful or not, but not on its probability of success.
2.2 Credit Markets
We assume throughout that all borrowing and lending takes place through competitive credit
markets in which entrepreneurs raise funds by issuing promises.4 As is standard in the adverse
selection literature, we put quite a bit of structure on these markets: in particular, we implicitly
assume that lenders are able to monitor entrepreneurial borrowing from these markets as well as
total entrepreneurial investment. We therefore refer to them throughout as “monitored” credit
markets, and to the loans that they extend as “monitored” loans.
Each monitored market is characterized by a pair () ∈ [0]×[0],f o r suﬃciently large,
where (i)  denotes the amount of promises that an entrepreneur borrowing from that market must
issue in it and (ii)  denotes the amount of his own resources that — in addition to the borrowed
funds — an entrepreneur must invest in the project in order to access that market.5 The gross
(contractual) interest rate in each market is normalized to one so that, regardless of the market
in which it is issued, each promise represents an obligation to deliver one unit of the consumption
good Tomorrow. All promises are backed by the investment project so that, if an entrepreneur
fails to deliver the promised payments, creditors are entitled to seize the project and its proceeds.
We let () denote the price of promises issued in market (). An entrepreneur that issues
promises in market () therefore invests a total of () ·  +  in the project. We use Ω to
denote the set of all monitored markets.
Monitored markets are clearly sophisticated. Any entrepreneur wishing to borrow from such
a market is forced to invest a certain amount. It is thus implicitly assumed that lenders in these
markets are able to monitor entrepreneurial investment.6 We also follow the adverse selection
literature in assuming that borrowing from monitored markets is exclusive, so that any given
entrepreneur is allowed to issue promises in only one market () ∈ Ω. This implicitly requires
4Our characterization of competitive credit markets under adverse selection builds on Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002), who studied a related problem in the context of competitive insurance markets.
5Technically speaking, we should restrict the set of markets () to a grid of ﬁnite values in order to avoid
measurability problems. Throughout the paper, we nonetheless treat  and  as continuous variables for simplicity.
We could always do so and then deﬁne a discrete grid to include the precise values of  and  that form part of our
equilibria. See Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) for a detailed discussion on this point.
6This assumption is standard in the adverse selection literature (see Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987),
and Martin (2009)).
6entrepreneurial borrowing from these markets to be monitored by lenders.7 Jointly, these features
of monitored markets ensure that the informational problem is purely one of adverse selection
or hidden entrepreneurial types. Given the monitoring capabilities of these markets, no relevant
entrepreneurial actions are hidden from lenders and no entrepreneur has an incentive to default
on his promises, since doing so would cost him the project. Finally, note that not all monitored
markets are accessible to entrepreneurs, who face a feasibility constraint. In particular, if we use
 to denote total entrepreneurial resources at the time of issuing promises, entrepreneurs can only
access markets () ∈ Ω for which  ≤ .8
This way of modeling credit markets allows us to determine equilibrium borrowing and lending
under perfect competition. Markets are not run by managers that make strategic decisions. In-
stead, they are deﬁned by their characteristics () and are open for business to all interested
borrowers and lenders. In each market, the price of promises () is determined by the forces of
demand and supply. Entrepreneurs wishing to borrow compare prices across markets with diﬀerent
characteristics and choose in which one of them to issue promises. Likewise, individuals wishing to
lend resources compare prices across markets and, given the average quality of promises issued in
each one of them, choose where to do so. It is assumed that all promises issued in each market are
pooled, so that lenders participating in a given market are entitled to a pro rata share of that mar-
ket’s total revenues. Hence, if we use −
() to denote the number of promises issued by individual

























for () ∈ Ω.
Credit markets in () ∈ Ω thus closely resemble the competitive pools that are common in
modern ﬁnancial markets. Insurance pools, credit card pools and — more prominently given recent
events — mortgage pools provide real-world examples of similar ﬁnancial arrangements. In our
model, each market pools promises made by diﬀerent entrepreneurs. Although all of these promises
are formally identical and they stipulate the same payment in the event of success, it is understood
7Exclusivity is an ubiquitous assumpion in environments of adverse selection at least since Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976).
8In our baseline model, entrepreneurs have only their endowment at the time of borrowing from markets () ∈ Ω
and, trivially,  = . This will not necessarily be true later on.
7that the actual return of promises issued by diﬀerent entrepreneurs might diﬀe r ,b o t hi na ne x - a n t e
and in an ex-post sense. Much like investors in mortgage backed securities, however, lenders in our
model are not concerned with the return of the speciﬁc promises issued by any one entrepreneur.
Instead, lenders buy a claim to a share of the pool’s proceeds, which depend on the average quality
of all promises being issued in it. Hence, they are only concerned with each market’s average return
as characterized by Equation (2).
We are now ready to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium of our baseline economy. Letting +
()
denote the number of promises “purchased” by individual  ∈  in market (),w ec a nd e ﬁne:9











()∈Ω satisfying: (i) exclusivity, so that −
() ≥ 0 for all  ∈ , () ∈ Ω,
with at most one strict inequality; (ii) feasibility, so that the total investment ﬁnanced with internal
funds does not exceed  =  for any entrepreneur; (iii) optimality, so that portfolio decisions
maximize expected consumption for given interest rates and returns to lenders as deﬁned in Equation








() for all () ∈ Ω. (3)
Whenever possible, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which all individuals in any subset of
the population — savers, good entrepreneurs and bad entrepreneurs — choose the same equilibrium
portfolios.
At ﬁrst glance, this deﬁnition of equilibrium is fully standard. Equations (1) and (2) jointly
imply that, in any equilibrium, () =1in all active markets () ∈ Ω. Any market in which
()  1 will not attract any lenders, and cannot be active in equilibrium. Any market in which
()  1 will imply that storage is not used by any lenders, violating Equation (1). This implies
that in active markets, in which promises are issued and traded in equilibrium, the price of promises
must adjust to reﬂect their underlying quality. From Equation (2), it must for example be true
in equilibrium that () =  in those markets in which only bad entrepreneurs issue promises,
w h i l ei tm u s ta l s oh o l dt h a t() =  in those markets in which only good entrepreneurs issue
promises.
9To say that 
+
() represents the number of shares purchased by individual  is a slight abuse of terminology
since, as we have already mentioned, an individual lending through market () is not buying any speciﬁcp r o m i s e s
b u ti si n s t e a da c q u i r i n gc l a i m st oas h a r eo f t h em a r k e t ’ st otal revenues. We nonetheless preserve this terminology
to avoid introducing additional notation.




() =0 ? For these
markets, in which there are no promises issued, returns are unspeciﬁed. But the optimization
problem of individuals is not well deﬁned without attributing some expected returns to borrowing
and lending in all markets. How should these expected returns be determined? This question
arises frequently in environments of adverse selection, in which there is usually a large number
of equilibria that rest on diﬀerent expected returns for inactive markets. An example of this are
pessimistic equilibria in which markets are inactive simply because agents expect them to have
very low returns. In these cases, pessimistic expectations can be sustained in equilibrium precisely
because, since markets are inactive, they cannot be disproved.
In a related setting, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) dealt with this issue by drawing from
the use of trembles in game theory. Their approach basically consists in perturbing the return
of inactive markets to see if an equilibrium survives or not. Formally, this perturbation of the
economy is constructed by introducing an agent that issues promises in all markets that are inactive
in equilibrium, thereby making it possible to deﬁne their expected returns. Consider such an
“external agent” that issues  · ()() promises in each inactive market () ∈ Ω and , like
good entrepreneurs, repays with probability .I ti st h e na s s u m e dt h a t()() → 0 as  →∞
for all () ∈ Ω, so that — as the perturbations converge to the original economy — this external
agent essentially anchors the expected returns of inactive markets for the ﬁrst inﬁnitesimal promises
traded. Although it constitutes a technical device to deﬁne expectations on inactive markets, the
external agent could be interpreted as the belief of market participants or as a government guarantee
on the ﬁrst promises traded: whatever the interpretation, the reason for assuming that this external
agent “delivers” like a good entrepreneur is to eliminate equilibria sustained solely by pessimism.10
In fact, Dubey and Geanakoplos show that this type of perturbation selects only the most robust
equilibria of the economy.
Once the economy is perturbed through the introduction of the external agent, we can compute
its equilibrium for each value of , i.e. for each issue of promises undertaken by the external agent.
Let these equilibria be called -equilibria: in each of them, due to the presence of the external agent,
there is trade in all markets () ∈ Ω. The equilibrium of the original economy is then deﬁned as












satisfy Deﬁnition 1 above and that obtain as the limit of a sequence of -equilibria. Thus, the
10It is clearly easier to sustain a given allocation as an equilibriumn when the prices of promises in of inactive
markets, and hence the gain of deviating for entrepreneurs, are very low.
9equilibrium price of promises in inactive markets must obtain as the limit of the sequence of prices
that result from the mix of entrepreneurial and external-agent portfolios in the -equilibria.11
The intuition behind this methodology is clear. By introducing an external agent that issues
a vanishingly small number of promises in each inactive market, it is possible to anchor expected
returns in these markets. By making the delivery of this external agent as good as the best
entrepreneurs in the economy, it is assumed that these expected returns are “optimistic”. In a
sense, then, markets that remain inactive in equilibrium do so despite their expected returns and
not because of them.12
2.3 Competitive Equilibria
In our baseline economy, competitive equilibria may be either separating or pooling depending on
whether good and bad entrepreneurs issue promises in diﬀerent markets or whether all entrepreneurs
issue promises in the same market. Separating equilibria are characterized as follows:
Proposition 1 Consider the baseline economy with monitored markets () ∈ Ω and entrepre-




















































11In our model, this implies that the equilibrium prices of promises in all inactive markets that are feasible (i.e.
for which  ≤ ) are such that bad entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between issuing in them or not.
12The methodology to determine whether a certain allocation is an equilibrium or not boils down to checking
whether entrepreneurs ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from it and issue promises in a diﬀerent market (),w h e r e






— only good entrepreneurs want to deviate, then the original allocation cannot be an equilibrium.
If, on the contrary, any market that attracts good entrepreneurs attracts bad ones as well, then the original allocation
can be supported as an equilibrium of the economy. In this case, along the sequence of -equilibria, bad entrepreneurs
can be allocated to inactive markets until the prices of promises in these markets become low enough to make them
indiﬀerent between issuing in these markets and sticking to the original allocation. At these prices, good entrepreneurs
(weakly) prefer the original allocation.
10and (∗) = ,w h e r e∗
is implicitly deﬁned by
 · (∗∗
) − ∗∗
+  =  · ( · ∗
+ ) −  · ∗
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (4) implies that, in the separating equilibrium, the investment of bad entrepreneurs
is not distorted relative to its ﬁrst-best level. These entrepreneurs borrow ∗∗
directly from
monitored markets, which they do by issuing
∗∗





at a unit price
of .13 As for their endowment, they can deposit it in the storage technology or lend it to






entrepreneurs, in order to take advantage of the higher price of promises in that market? The





, good entrepreneurs are distorting their
portfolio decision so that it is incentive compatible. How is this achieved?
Suppose ﬁrst that entrepreneurs have no endowment, so that their investment must be fully
ﬁnanced through borrowing. In this case, incentive compatibility can only be achieved in our setting
by suﬃciently distorting the investment of good entrepreneurs relative to its eﬃcient level, i.e. by
suﬃciently contracting or expanding the amount of promises issued by good entrepreneurs. Of
these two possibilities, we shall refer throughout to the one in which good entrepreneurs achieve
incentive compatibility by under-investing relative to their eﬃcient level.14 Separation through
such a distortion of investment is clearly costly. Once entrepreneurs have some resources of their
own, it is therefore eﬃcient for good ones to invest them fully in their project. Not only is this
directly proﬁt a b l ef o rt h e m ,i ta l s ob e n e ﬁts them indirectly by increasing the cost of imitation for
bad entrepreneurs whose project is most likely to fail.15 By enabling them to access markets with
higher values of ,i n c r e a s e si n thus relax the incentive compatibility constraint of Equation (6)
and enable good entrepreneurs to weakly expand their investment. Eventually, if entrepreneurial
endowment increases enough, it reaches a level   ∗∗
that enables good entrepreneurs to
13The equilibrium is not unique in a trivial way, since bad entrepreneurs could alternatively borrow (
∗∗
− )
from ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnance the rest from their own resources. This multiplicity is irrelevant in terms of the
equilibrium allocation and we thus ignore it.
14This is completely inconsequential for our results, but it simpliﬁes terminology by allowing us to refer throughout
to the under-investment of good entrepreneurs.
15Note that the amount of resources commited to the project by an entrepreneur, i.e. ,i sa k i nt oc o l l a t e r a l .
Indeed, our contracts, in which an entrepreneur borrows () ·  and invests  of his own resources in the project
are isomorphic to contracts in which the entrepreneur borrows () ·+ from ﬁnancial markets while pledging 
as collateral, which he loses in the event that the project fails. See Martin (2009) for this alternative interpretation.
11achieve their ﬁrst-best level of investment.
Besides the separating equilibrium of Proposition 1, this economy may also display pooling
equilibria in which all entrepreneurs issue promises in the same market. These equilibria are
characterized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider the baseline economy with monitored markets () ∈ Ω and entrepre-













for all  ∈ , (7)
and (
∗) = ,w h e r e
∗ must satisfy
 · ( · 
∗ + ) −  · 




Although they are fairly standard, a formal proof of both Propositions is provided in the Ap-
pendix. Here, we provide some intuition behind their basic logic. In all of the equilibria outlined
above, good entrepreneurs invest their resources fully in the project. This is a direct consequence
of the introduction of the external agent since, without it, good entrepreneurs might decide to issue
in markets with   because of pessimistic beliefs. In all of these equilibria, moreover, the
proﬁts of bad entrepreneurs must weakly exceed  ·(∗∗
)−∗∗
+.16 The reason is that the
equilibrium price of promises in monitored markets can never fall below , which already reﬂects
the worst possible expectations that lenders can have regarding the quality of borrowers: hence,
bad entrepreneurs are always able to attain at least this level of proﬁts. These two features jointly
restrict the set of separating equilibria to a single allocation, whereas they reduce the set of pooling
equilibria to those allocations satisfying both ∗ =  and Equation (8).
It is interesting to note that both type of equilibria coexist for low values of .A s e n t r e -
preneurial resources increase, however, they eventually reach a level beyond which Equation (8)
can no longer be satisﬁed and all pooling equilibria cease to exist. The reason for this is that bad
entrepreneurs face a trade-oﬀ in any pooling allocation: while they beneﬁt from issuing promises at
16That is, the maximum level of proﬁts that bad entrepreneurs can attain when their expected cost of funds equals
the risk-free rate.
12a price that exceeds their expected return, they are also forced to invest all of their own resources
in their (relatively unproductive) project. Increases in entrepreneurial wealth naturally strengthen
this latter eﬀect at the expense of the former until, eventually, all pooling equilibria unravel.
The analysis thus far has assumed that Equation (1) holds, so that total entrepreneurial invest-
ment does not exceed the economy’s endowment  and the equilibrium rate of interest equals the
return to storage. From Equations (6) and (8), we can now provide a formal deﬁnition of max:
max =m a x (9)
s.t.  · () −

 ·  ≥  · (∗∗
) − ∗∗
which denotes the maximum that can be invested by an entrepreneur in either a pooling or a
separating equilibrium as deﬁned in Propositions (1) and (2). Equation (9) thus makes the condition
in Equation (1) precise and it completes the formal description of the baseline economy.
The results of this section are fairly standard in the adverse selection literature. If lending is
monitored as we have characterized it here, the equilibrium might entail either pooling or separation
of diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs. In separating equilibria, good entrepreneurs restrict their total
investment in order to issue promises at a high price. In pooling equilibria, all entrepreneurs borrow
from the same market and the price of promises reﬂects their average productivity. Interestingly,
whether both type of equilibria are possible or not depends on the level of entrepreneurial resources.
As  rises beyond a certain threshold, only the separating equilibrium remains; if  rises even
further, this separating equilibrium eventually attains the ﬁrst-best levels of investment and the
ineﬃciencies associated with adverse selection disappear. Note that these results are independent of
the actual source of entrepreneurial resources, which we have assumed so far to be an endowment,
i.e.  = . We now assume instead that  =0and allow for an alternative possibility: namely,
that entrepreneurs borrow these resources from other ﬁnancial markets.
3 Modifying the economy: unmonitored lending
As is common in settings of adverse selection, we have so far assumed that entrepreneurs can only
borrow from monitored markets as characterized in Ω. What happens if we extend the set of
markets in the economy to allow for lending through unmonitored markets, which do not condition
entrepreneurial borrowing and investment in any way? Intuition suggests that, precisely because
13they are unmonitored, these markets are particularly prone to adverse selection and this will keep
them inactive in equilibrium. This intuition, however, is incorrect. As we now argue, unmonitored
markets may not just be active in equilibrium, but — somewhat paradoxically — they may also allow
the economy to become more eﬃcient.
3.1 Modiﬁed Setup
We modify the economy of Section 2 by introducing a new set of markets denoted by Ω.I t i s
assumed that borrowing from these markets does not impose any conditions on entrepreneurial in-
vestment or on additional borrowing. In particular, these markets are assumed to be non-exclusive,
so that entrepreneurs are free to issue promises in as many of them as they choose.17 We therefore
refer to them as “unmonitored” credit markets, and to the loans that they extend as “unmonitored”
loans. Each unmonitored market is fully characterized by a scalar  ∈ [0],f o r suﬃciently
large, which denotes the total number of promises that must be issued by any entrepreneur borrow-
ing from it.18 The gross (contractual) interest rate in all markets  ∈ Ω Today is normalized
to one, while the equilibrium price of promises in each one of them is denoted by .
Exactly as their monitored counterparts, unmonitored markets operate like competitive pools.
All promises issued in a given market  ∈ Ω are pooled together, and any individual lending
in that market acquires a claim to a share of the pool’s total return. In the modiﬁed economy,
then, monitored and unmonitored markets exist side by side and all individuals can freely choose
where to lend and/or borrow. The question that interests us, then, is how the introduction of
unmonitored markets aﬀects the set of competitive equilibria of our economy.
To understand this, note two important features regarding these markets. The ﬁrst is that there
can never be a separating equilibrium in which entrepreneurs of diﬀerent types borrow from diﬀerent
unmonitored markets  ∈ Ω. The reason is that, since these markets are non-exclusive and
their lending does not condition investment, bad entrepreneurs necessarily gain by issuing promises
in them whenever the price of promises exceeds . Doing so enables these entrepreneurs to obtain
ab e n e ﬁt without incurring in any costs. Since borrowing from these markets does not condition
investment, it does not require entrepreneurs to distort their investment decision; since it is not
17Implicitly, it is thus assumed that total borrowing from markets in Ω cannot be monitored. This implies that
the set of entrepreneurial actions that can be monitored is unaﬀected by the introduction of these markets, so that
— even if they could — lenders would have no reason to modify the structure of monitored markets () ∈ Ω.
18Once again, we should restrict the set of markets  to a grid of ﬁnite values in order to avoid measurability
problems. We nonetheless treat  throughout as a continuous variable (see Footnote 5).
14exclusive and it does not condition borrowing, it does not require entrepreneurs to modify their
overall borrowing decision either.19 Hence, the only possible equilibrium in unmonitored markets
() ∈ Ω is a pooling equilibrium in which the price of promises in active markets never exceeds
.
A second feature of unmonitored markets  ∈ Ω is that they allow for strategic default
in a way that is not possible when all borrowing is channeled through monitored markets. This
follows directly from the fact that unmonitored borrowing does not impose conditions on invest-
ment. Hence, entrepreneurs are in principle able to limit the repayment that they make to these
markets ex-post by restricting their total investment ex-ante. In particular, when an entrepreneur
raises resources by issuing promises in unmonitored markets, he can chose between: (i) using these
resources as intended and investing them in his project, or; (ii) depositing these resources in the
storage technology or lending them to other entrepreneurs, without investing them in his project.
If he chooses the second option, the entrepreneur will default on his unmonitored promises Tomor-
row as creditors will have nothing to seize from him. This is not an option when all borrowing is
undertaken through monitored markets () ∈ Ω, in which investment is monitored and tied to
borrowing.
These features have important implications for the pricing of unmonitored promises in any
competitive equilibrium. First, the price of these promises in any inactive market  ∈ Ω
must satisfy  ≤ . If the price of promises exceeds  in a given unmonitored market, bad
entrepreneurs have an incentive to issue promises in it and the market cannot be inactive. But
entrepreneurs might have an incentive to issue in markets  ∈ Ω even when   ,a s
long as they expect to default on these promises. Whether or not an entrepreneur ﬁnds it optimal
to do this depends on his investment options and on the market price of promises. To illustrate
this, consider the choice faced by an entrepreneur of type  that is deciding (i) whether or not
to issue promises in market () ∈ Ω at a price of (), as well as (ii) which unmonitored
markets to borrow from. If he decides to invest nothing, such an entrepreneur is clearly better-oﬀ
by borrowing from all unmonitored markets and defaulting on all of these promises. If he decides
instead to borrow from the monitored market and invest in his project, such an entrepreneur can
only beneﬁt from issuing unmonitored promises in those markets in which   . Therefore,
19This is clearly diﬀerent from what happens in monitored markets () ∈ Ω, in which the issue of promises in
any one market necessarily determines an entrepreneur’s total investment and it prevents him from accessing the
remaining markets.
15this entrepreneur will choose to borrow from market () and invest if and only if
 ·
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 · ,( 1 0 )
The right-hand side of Equation (10) denotes the entrepreneur’s proﬁts if he borrows from all
unmonitored markets and deposits the proceeds in the storage technology.20 The left hand side
instead depicts the entrepreneur’s proﬁts in the event that he borrows from the monitored market
and invests accordingly: in this case, he will only chose to borrow in those unmonitored markets in
which the price of promises exceeds his expected repayment, .21






 ,( 1 1 )
which denotes the maximum number of unmonitored promises that an entrepreneur of type  ∈
{} can issue in equilibrium before their expected cost of repayment necessarily exceeds the
net gains of investing the ﬁrst-best amount ∗∗
. Once the total number of unmonitored promises
issued by an entrepreneur of type  ∈ {} exceeds this threshold, he is therefore better-oﬀ by
investing nothing and defaulting than he would be by investing ∗∗
. We allow for this possibility





We are now ready to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium of our modiﬁed economy. Let  ∈
{01} capture individual ’s rate of default on the promises he has issued in market  ∈ Ω,
where  =0implies full repayment and  =1implies full default.22 Using −
 to denote
the amount of promises issued by individual  ∈  in market  ∈ Ω, the (gross) revenues per
unit lent in that market will be given by:
20In equilibrium, the return to depositing in the storage technology will equal the return of lending to other
entrepreneurs.
21It would seem possible that, by borrowing from unmonitored markets, entrepreneurs could “dilute” their promises
issued in monitored markets () ∈ Ω and default on them as well. Equation (10) shows that it is never optimal
for entrepreneurs to do so in our setting, since they prefer to avoid investment altogether before reaching this point.
In a more general setting, the introduction of unmonitored markets might generate incentives for debt dilution that
may require making monitored loans senior to unmonitored ones.
22Note that these default rates are not decided ex-post but rather ex-ante at the time of investment: once an
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Exactly as in monitored markets, the price of unmonitored promises must adjust in all active
markets  ∈ Ω to make  =1 . Also as in monitored markets, Equation (12) illustrates that
it is important to specify the returns of those unmonitored markets that are inactive in equilibrium.
We do so once more by considering an external agent that issues  · ∈Ω() promises in all
such markets  ∈ Ω and — like good entrepreneurs that do not default — repays with probability
.23 Our external agent thus issues promises in all of the economy’s inactive markets, both
monitored and unmonitored, which enables us to deﬁne a sequence of -equilibria in which there is
trade in all markets () ∈ Ω and  ∈ Ω. It is then assumed that both ()∈Ω() → 0 and
∈Ω() → 0 as  →∞for all inactive markets () ∈ Ω and  ∈ Ω, so that the expected
returns of all markets are speciﬁed for the ﬁrst inﬁnitesimal promises traded.
Letting +
() denote the number of promises “purchased” by individual  ∈  in market
 ∈ Ω,w ec a nd e ﬁne:24















()∈Ω∈Ω satisfying: (i) exclusivity among mon-
itored markets () ∈ Ω; (ii) feasibility, so that when borrowing from monitored markets the total




 for any entrepreneur
 ∈ ; (iii) optimality, so that portfolio (and default) decisions maximize the expected consumption
o fe n t r e p r e n e u r sa n dl e n d e r sf o rg i v e np r i c e sa n dr e t u r n sa sd e ﬁned in Equations (2) and (12); (iv)
market-clearing, so that Equation (3) holds and the equivalent condition is satisﬁed for markets
 ∈ Ω, and; (v) individual portfolios and default decisions, as well as prices, obtain as the limit
of a sequence of -equilibria.
Once a competitive equilibrium is deﬁned in this manner, its characterization is relatively simple.
On the one hand, given trades in unmonitored markets  ∈ Ω, our previous characterization of
23Since we do not want markets to remain artiﬁcially inactive due to pessimistic beliefs, we do not allow the external
agent to default on its promises.
24Once again, this is a slight abuse of notation since individual lenders actually purchase the right to a share of
the market’s total return (see Footnote 9).
17competitive equilibria in monitored markets () ∈ Ω is still valid.25 On the other hand, we have
already argued that all borrowing in unmonitored markets  ∈ Ω must necessarily entail pooling.
Hence, it can approximately be said that the equilibrium of the modiﬁed economy will be exactly
as before with one diﬀerence: when borrowing from monitored markets () ∈ Ω ,t h ea m o u n t
of internal funds that entrepreneurs can commit to the project is no longer exogenous. Instead, it
is endogenously determined in equilibrium because it includes any additional funds raised through




.T h i s
explains why, besides issuing promises in monitored markets, good entrepreneurs might also want
to issue promises in unmonitored ones despite their (weakly) lower price. Doing so enables them to
expand their investment both directly and also indirectly by relaxing their incentive compatibility
constraint in monitored markets.
This completes our extension of the economy to allow for unmonitored borrowing. Precisely
because it does not condition investment, we have argued that this type of borrowing may be
subject to strategic default. Despite this feature, however, the competitive equilibrium of the
modiﬁed economy turns out to have a relatively simple characterization. In monitored markets,
the equilibrium is as in Propositions 1 and 2, whereas in unmonitored markets it necessarily entails
pooling. We have also hinted at the possibility that issuing in unmonitored markets may be
beneﬁcial for good entrepreneurs, even if the price of these promises is relatively low. Does this
mean that unmonitored markets may be eﬃciency-enhancing for the economy as a whole? We turn
to this question next.
3.2 Competitive Equilibria
Despite the potential beneﬁts of unmonitored markets, they are not necessarily used in equilibrium.
Indeed, as the next proposition claims, the equilibria characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 are still
equilibria of the modiﬁed economy.
Proposition 3 Consider the economy with monitored markets () ∈ Ω and unmonitored mar-
kets  ∈ Ω when  =0 . All of the equilibria characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 are
also equilibria of the modiﬁed economy for the case in which  =0 . In any such equilibrium,
25Once again, precisely because borrowing from markets  ∈ Ω is unmonitored, its introduction does not change
the set of entrepreneurial actions that can be monitored. Hence, even if they could, lenders would have no incentive
to modify the characteristics of monitored markets () ∈ Ω.








for all  ∈ Ω and  ∈ , and bad entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between: (i) issuing promises in
all unmonitored markets and setting investment toz e r oi no r d e rt od e f a u l to nt h e m ,o r ;( i i )i s s u i n g
promises only in monitored markets and investing in their projects accordingly.
This result is very intuitive, so we do not provide a formal proof. Essentially, it says that there
are always equilibria of the modiﬁed economy in which the introduction of unmonitored markets
turns out to be inconsequential because they remain inactive. Naturally, it must be true that
prices satisfy  ≤  in equilibrium if markets  ∈ Ω are inactive. But prices cannot be
zero either, since the presence of the external agent rules this out. Hence, the only possibility is
the one depicted in Proposition 3, in which the price of promises in unmonitored markets is low
enough (although not zero) to make bad entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between (i) issuing promises
in all such markets and defaulting on them, and; (ii) borrowing only from monitored markets and
investing in their projects.26
But the modiﬁed economy has many other equilibria in which unmonitored markets are active.
Among these, the following proposition characterizes the one that is of particular interest to us,
which we refer to as the default-free eﬃcient equilibrium:
Proposition 4 Consider the economy with monitored markets () ∈ Ω and unmonitored mar-
kets  ∈ Ω when  =0 . The default-free eﬃcient equilibrium of this economy is characterized
as follows:
26By applying Equation (11), we can illustrate such an equilibrium for the case in which there is separation in
monitored markets as in Proposition 1. It suﬃc e st oc o n s t r u c tas e q u e n c eo f-equilibria of the modiﬁed economy












At this price, bad entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between issuing promises in unmonitored markets and investing
nothing or not doing so and borrowing instead from monitored markets to invest 
∗∗
. This price is consistent
with equilibrium because, along the sequence of -equilibria, some bad entrepreneurs are actually issuing promises
in unmonitored markets along with the external agent and defaulting on them. Good entrepreneurs instead strictly
prefer to borrow from monitored markets.






 ,a n d ,
 =  · ∗
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and prices in inactive markets  ∈ Ω,  6= ∗







 ·  +  · ∗
 =  · (∗∗
) − ∗∗
. (15)
This equilibrium entails no default, i.e. ∗
 =0for all  ∈ , and it exists if and only if
∗
  
,w h e r e
 is as in Equation (11).
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us provide an intuition for the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4. In monitored
markets the equilibrium is separating and each type  ∈ {} of entrepreneur issues promises at
ap r i c eo f, which accurately reﬂects his underlying productivity. At the same time, however,
the equilibrium in unmonitored markets entails pooling and all entrepreneurs issue ∗
 promises
at a price of ,w h i c hr e ﬂects the average productivity among all investment projects.27 Moreover,
Equation (14) illustrates that it is precisely these revenues raised in unmonitored markets, which
amount to ∗
 · , that allow good entrepreneurs to separate themselves in monitored markets
27This equilibrium is not unique along a non-trivial dimension. Provided that entrepreneurs issue 
∗
 promises in
u n m o n i t o r e dm a r k e t s ,i ti si r r e l e v a n tw h e t h e rt h e yd os oi no ne market (as characterized in Proposition 4) or whether
they spread these issues across many markets.






.I n t h i s eﬃcient no-default equilibrium, all
entrepreneurs attain their ﬁrst-best level of investment (hence, the eﬃcient) and none of them
default on their unmonitored promises (hence, the no-default).
There are two observations with respect to this equilibrium that will prove useful in the dis-
cussion that follows. The ﬁrst is that, despite the presence of the external agent, all but one of
unmonitored markets remain inactive. The reason for this is that the prices of promises in all such
inactive markets lie below : they are so low, in fact, that bad entrepreneurs obtain the same
proﬁts by issuing promises in all unmonitored markets and then defaulting on them than they do
b yi s s u i n go n l yi nm a r k e t∗
 (and in monitored markets) and investing ∗∗
.28 In this regard,
Equation (15) represents the equivalent of Equation (10) for this equilibrium. A second observa-
tion regarding the equilibrium is that good entrepreneurs issue promises in both types of markets,
even though the price of unmonitored promises is lower than the price at which they sell moni-
tored promises. This behavior might seem suboptimal. As we now argue, however, it is by issuing
unmonitored promises that good entrepreneurs are able to access better conditions in monitored
markets and — ultimately — to invest ∗∗
. The reason, of course, is that these entrepreneurs are
eager to invest these additional funds in their own projects whereas bad entrepreneurs are reluctant
to do so.
3.3 Discussion
We want to argue that the allocation in Proposition 4 is a competitive equilibrium of the economy,
in which all agents optimize given the price of promises in diﬀerent markets. Bad entrepreneurs
ﬁnd it optimal to borrow from monitored markets to ﬁnance their eﬃcient level of investment but
they also beneﬁt by issuing ∗
 promises in unmonitored markets ,w h i c ht h e ys e l la tap r i c eo f
even though their expected delivery equals . Moreover, given the prices of promises across all
unmonitored markets as characterized in Equation (15), these entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between
(i) issuing unmonitored promises only in market ∗
 ∈ Ω and borrowing from monitored markets
to invest ∗∗
in their project and (ii) issuing in all unmonitored markets  ∈ Ω and defaulting
28Along the sequence of -equilibria, the prices of promises also maintain this indiﬀerence for bad entrepreneurs.
In these equilibria, some bad entrepreneurs borrow and invest as in Proposition 4 while the rest issue promises in all
u n m o n i t o r e dm a r k e t sa n dt h e ni n v e s tn o t h i n gi nt h e i rp r o j ect, depositing instead all of the proceeds in the storage
technology or lending them to others through ﬁnancial markets. This last group of bad entrepreneurs, which clearly
defaults on all of its promises, vanishes in the limit along with the issues of the external agent (i.e. as ∈Ω() → 0).
The sequence of -equilibria thus converges to the equilibrium of Proposition 4.
21fully on these promises.29 As for lenders, they have no reason to change their portfolios because
both monitored and unmonitored markets yield the same gross return as the storage technology.30
It remains to be shown that good entrepreneurs have no incentives to change their issuing strategy,
even though the price of promises in unmonitored markets is below the expected delivery by these
entrepreneurs, i.e.  .
It is certainly costly for good entrepreneurs to issue promises in unmonitored markets. It also
indirectly beneﬁcial for good entrepreneurs to do so, however, because it enables them to increase
 and thus to access monitored markets that require higher levels of . Formally, and as long
as his total investment does not exceed ∗∗
, the highest possible proﬁts of a good entrepreneur
that issues ∗
promises in monitored markets at a price of  and  promises in unmonitored




()+ · ) − (∗
()+)
i
,( 1 6 )
where the notation ∗
() is meant to illustrate that ∗
corresponds to the separating allocation
of Proposition 1, which eﬀectively depends on  through the incentive compatibility constraint
of Equation (6). By fully diﬀerentiating Equation (16) with respect to ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t





.T h u s ,
when  = , the best possible equilibrium for these entrepreneurs is one in which they borrow in
unmonitored markets until their total investment reaches the eﬃcient level of ∗∗
: this corresponds
exactly to the characterization of ∗
 in Proposition 4. Relative to the equilibria of Propositions 1
and 2, the competitive equilibrium of Proposition 4 thus raises the welfare of good entrepreneurs.
Of course, the price of promises in market ∗
 ∈ Ω equals  only if no one is expected to default
on them, which in turn requires that ∗
  
. Otherwise, Equation (15) is necessarily violated
and bad entrepreneurs prefer to issue promises in all unmonitored markets and then default. By
29By issuing promises in market 
∗









 · ( − 
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of these two expressions yields Equatrion (15), which must necessarily hold with equality in equilibrium. Otherwise,
the prices in inactive unmonitored markets could not obtain as the limit of a sequence of -equilibria in which both
the external agent and bad entrepreneurs issued promises in these markets.
30This is also the case for inactive markets, in which prices reﬂect the mix of promises issued by the external agent
(who repays) and by bad entrepreneurs (who default) at the limit of the sequence of -equilibria.
22combining Equations (11) and (14), the requirement that ∗
  





















,( 1 7 )
which determines a minimum value of  beyond which bad entrepreneurs opt for investment and
repayment. Intuitively, if they are to invest ∗∗
in an incentive-compatible manner, good entrepre-
neurs must raise a minimum amount of resources through unmonitored markets. It is, after all, the
reluctance of bad entrepreneurs to invest these resources in their own projects that enables good
entrepreneurs to attain the eﬃcient level of investment. But the amount of promises ∗
 required
to raise these resources is decreasing in their price, i.e. in . If the proportion of bad entrepreneurs
in the economy is suﬃciently high, the price of promises is so low that ∗
 surpasses the maximum
value compatible with repayment by these entrepreneurs. In this case, the allocation characterized
in Proposition 4 is no longer a competitive equilibrium of the economy.31
But let us assume that Equation (17) is satisﬁed and that the allocation of Proposition 4 is
indeed a competitive equilibrium of the modiﬁed economy. We have already argued that, in this
equilibrium, the use of unmonitored markets raises the welfare of good entrepreneurs. But why
exactly does this happen? In the absence of such markets, good entrepreneurs have to distort
their investment in order to separate themselves in monitored markets. True, they can reduce
this distortion by pooling themselves with bad entrepreneurs, thereby fully cross-subsidizing the
latter’s borrowing and investment. This is ineﬃcient, however. Since investment and borrowing
are bundled in monitored markets, pooling forces bad entrepreneurs to distort their investment





, it might still be possible for good entrepreneurs to invest 
∗∗
in equilibrium as long as the
ratio of those entrepreneurs in the economy is suﬃciently high. If only good entrepreneurs are expected to deliver





: a sw eh a v ea r g u e d ,g o o d
entrepreneurs might still beneﬁt from issuing them at this price as long as it exceeds 
.T om a k es u r et h a tt h i si s
an equilibrium of the economy, it would have to be veriﬁed that good entrepreneurs have no incentive to default on
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23their project, bad entrepreneurs would require less of these funds to attain the same level of proﬁts.
Unmonitored markets, in which lenders do not impose any conditions on entrepreneurial investment
or borrowing, make such an optimal degree of cross-subsidization possible. Monitored markets
are of course useful, though, because by conditioning borrowing on investment they enable good
entrepreneurs to build on unmonitored funds in order to further expand their investment in an
incentive-compatible manner. Together, both types of markets therefore achieve more than either
one of them does separately.
Another way of interpreting the positive role of unmonitored markets is that they enable good
entrepreneurs to “buy” an eﬃcient screening technology. In monitored markets, good entrepreneurs
can separate themselves either by distorting their total investment or by investing their own wealth
in the project: of the two, the former is costly whereas the latter is not. If the initial problem is
one of scarcity of entrepreneurial wealth, i.e. lack of the resource that allows for eﬃcient screening,
unmonitored markets can help by allowing good entrepreneurs to purchase more of it. Although
directly costly because it is undertaken at a premium, this purchase is indirectly beneﬁcial for good
entrepreneurs because it allows them to access better terms in monitored markets: the reason, once
again, is that bad entrepreneurs are reluctant to risk these resources by investing them in their
own projects. But this implies that this purchase can only be eﬀective if it does not condition
entrepreneurial investment, i.e. if it is carried out in unmonitored markets. Otherwise, good
entrepreneurs would always have an incentive to purchase these resources in markets that require
them to be invested, eﬀectively taking us back to the original economy.
We have thus shown how, contrary to common wisdom, welfare in our economy may be enhanced
through the introduction of unmonitored lending despite the presence of asymmetric information.
Relative to the competitive equilibria of Section 2, the competitive equilibrium of Proposition 4
unambiguously enhances the eﬃciency at which the economy operates: whereas good investment
expands, bad investment remains undistorted at its eﬃcient level. It follows that, as is common in
environments of adverse selection, those competitive equilibria of the baseline economy must have
been ineﬃcient. In our setting, this ineﬃciency depends on one implicit assumption: namely, that
all lending is monitored. As we now argue, in fact, the competitive equilibrium of Proposition 4
decentralizes the constrained optimal allocation.
244 Constrained optimality
Let us now return to the baseline economy of Section 2, with  =0 . Imagine that, instead of using
markets to allocate credit, we leave the task to a benevolent central planner seeking to maximize
the economy’s total consumption Tomorrow. To minimize the departure from previous sections, we
can think of this planner as intermediating between savers and entrepreneurs, exactly as markets
do. Like markets, the planner; (i) lends to entrepreneurs and monitors their investment; (ii) does
not observe entrepreneurial types; (iii) must break even in the aggregate in order to compensate
savers for the resources that are lent to entrepreneurs. Unlike markets, however, the planner does
not need to break even on each type of loan that it makes, since there is no reason for which it
cannot engage in cross-subsidization between diﬀerent types of loans.32 It is well known that doing
so can typically be welfare-enhancing, and we now explore this possibility.
Consider that a central planner oﬀers diﬀerent types of loans and that it uses transfers to cross-
subsidize between them. In particular, we can think of the planner as designing one loan for good
entrepreneurs (the “good loan”) and another one for bad entrepreneurs (the “bad loan”). The good
loan provides interested entrepreneurs with  units to invest Today and it requires them to pay

 units Tomorrow in the event of success. The bad loan instead provides applicants with 
units to invest Today and it requires them to pay back

 units Tomorrow in the event of success.
Besides these interest payments, the good loan requires applicants to pay a “transfer fee” of  units
in the event of success. The proceeds from this fee are fully distributed among applicants to the










 · () −  +





 · () −

 ·  −  ·  ≤  · () −  +
 ·  · 
 ,( 1 8 )
 · () −  −  ·  ≥  · () −

 +
 ·  · 
 ,( 1 9 )
where Equations (18) and (19) respectively represent the incentive compatibility constraints of bad
and good entrepreneurs and we have already taken into account the zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n tf o rt h e
32Markets, of course, cannot do this because no lenders are willing to oﬀer loans that yield losses in expectations.
25planner in cross-subsidizing across loans. The solution to this problem, which is characterized in
the following Proposition, follows directly from the optimization and hence we omit the proof.33
Proposition 5 Consider our baseline economy when  =0 . The optimal solution to the planner’s
problem entails:
 = ∗∗

























This allocation is identical to the competitive equilibrium of Proposition 4, both in terms of invest-
ment and welfare.
Proposition 5 captures a well-known result in the adverse selection literature. By resorting
to transfers, a central planner can improve upon allocations that entail either full separation or
full pooling. The intuition for this result is as follows: by engaging in cross-subsidization between
diﬀerent types of loans, the planner directly increases the cost of loans for good entrepreneurs
but it also increases the cost of imitation for bad entrepreneurs. This cross-subsidization thus
enables good entrepreneurs to make a payment in order to “relax” their incentive constraint. In
our economy, the optimal size of this transfer is the one that allows good entrepreneurs to undertake
their eﬃcient level of investment in an incentive-compatible manner. Clearly, this solution coincides
with the allocation of Proposition 4 and it outperforms the separating equilibrium of Proposition
1 and the pooling equilibria of Proposition 2.
This planner intervention lends itself to a very natural interpretation. We have already men-
tioned that the presence of adverse selection can be interpreted as a consumption externality.34 In
our setting, bad entrepreneurs constrain the choices of their good counterparts through the incen-
tive compatibility constraint. Since they do not internalize this eﬀect, bad entrepreneurs impose an
externality that may lead to ineﬃciencies. The central planner, by implementing transfers among
diﬀerent types of loans, eﬀectively allows good entrepreneurs to pay bad ones so that they inter-
nalize the externality that they generate. This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint and
allows good entrepreneurs to expand their investment in equilibrium.
33The result follows directly by solving the maximization problem assuming that only Equation (18) binds and
then verifying that, at the solution, Equation (19) is slack.
34See Rustichini and Siconolﬁ (2004) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) for a discussion along these lines.
26In the presence of adverse selection in credit markets, the competitive equilibrium is typically
ineﬃcient. This section has shown that there is a welfare-enhancing intervention by the planner
that consists in lending funds to entrepreneurs while cross-subsidizing among diﬀerent types of
loans. But, as Proposition 4 had already argued, this constrained optimal allocation can also be
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium when the baseline economy is modiﬁed to allow for
unmonitored borrowing and lending. However, whereas the planner can always achieve constrained
optimality, markets can only do so under certain conditions. The reason is that unmonitored
lending, which is necessary to implement the optimal level of cross-subsidization without distorting
investment, opens the door to strategic default. In a sense, this type of lending has to perform a risky
balancing act: whereas it must be high enough to enable good entrepreneurs to “buy” the eﬃcient
level of separation in monitored markets, it must not be so high as to generate widespread default
by bad entrepreneurs. Otherwise, this default might itself limit the extent to which unmonitored
markets can be eﬀectively used in equilibrium.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The present paper has analyzed a standard setting of adverse selection in credit markets. In
particular, we have studied an economy in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the
quality of their investment opportunities and they need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional
wisdom suggests that, in such settings, competitive equilibria will typically be ineﬃcient. The
reason for this is that adverse selection imposes an externality: through the incentive compatibility
constraint, the choices made by one type of entrepreneur constrain the choices available to others.
To attain eﬃciency, this externality needs to be internalized. This could be done, for example, by
allowing for transfers among types of entrepreneurs. Such a solution cannot be implemented by
market participants on their own, however, because it requires some loans to yield expected gains
and others to yield expected losses. Obviously, no lenders have an incentive to oﬀer the latter in
equilibrium.
We have argued that the conventional wisdom for this class of environments rests on one implicit
assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from monitored markets. If additional unmonitored
markets are added, in which entrepreneurs can obtain additional funds that do not condition their
investment or borrowing in any way, we have shown that the constrained eﬃcient allocation is an
equilibrium of the economy. We have provided an intuition for this result. If good entrepreneurs
27can distinguish themselves in the eyes of monitored markets by investing their own resources in
the project, it might be beneﬁcial for them to raise more resources through unmonitored markets.
Of course, doing so is costly. Whenever good entrepreneurs borrow from unmonitored markets,
bad entrepreneurs also have an incentive to do so in order to beneﬁt from the ensuing cross-
subsidization. Good entrepreneurs, then, face a trade-oﬀ: borrowing from unmonitored markets is
directly costly because it entails cross-subsidization of bad borrowers, but it is indirectly beneﬁcial
because it allows them to relax the incentive compatibility constraint in monitored markets. We
have shown that there is an equilibrium of our economy in which this trade-oﬀ is exploited optimally
to attain the eﬃcient levels of investment. In such an equilibrium, there is pooling of all borrowers
in unmonitored markets and separation of borrowers with diﬀerent types in monitored markets.
This result has important implications for how we think about the welfare costs of adverse
selection in ﬁnancial markets. It implies that adverse selection can only lead to ineﬃciencies if un-
monitored markets shut down or if they fail to function properly. It is widely argued, in particular,
that adverse selection has played an important role during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Our model
suggests at least two mechanisms that may have made this possible by impairing the working of
unmonitored markets. The ﬁrst and most direct possibility is that the economy switched to a “pes-
simistic” equilibrium, in which low expected returns led to the shutdown of unmonitored markets
and to the ensuing fall in investment. The second possibility is that the volume of unmonitored
lending became too large relative to the productivity of less reliable borrowers: as we have seen, this
would increase the incidence of default among these borrowers and it could also lead to the shut-
down of unmonitored markets. These two possibilities have very diﬀerent implications in terms of
policy response. A bout of widespread pessimism requires the government to manipulate expecta-
tions and restore conﬁdence, but not necessarily to orchestrate a large-scale intervention in markets;
a shock that renders unmonitored markets unable to attain eﬃciency, however, does require the
government to step in and substitute these markets directly. As this discussion illustrates, we are
only beginning to understand the relationship between market development and adverse selection,
and a thorough characterization of this relationship is crucial for the design of appropriate policies
and institutions.
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306A p p e n d i x
6.1 Equilibria of the Baseline Economy
6.1.1 Separating Equilibrium (Proposition 1)
In order to show that the allocation of Proposition 1 is an equilibrium, we verify that; whenever
there is a market ( b  b ) ∈ Ω and a price (   ) ∈
£
¤
such that it is (weakly) preferred
by good entrepreneurs to equilibrium allocation, it is also strictly preferred by bad entrepreneurs.
This means that, along the sequence of -equilibria, the presence of the external agent in inactive
markets can be counterbalanced by bad entrepreneurs up to the point at which these entrepreneurs
are indiﬀerent between issuing in diﬀerent markets with  ≤ . In this case, as () → 0,t h e
presence of bad entrepreneurs in inactive markets can be made vanishingly small alongside that of
the external agent so that the sequence of -equilibria converges to the separating equilibrium of
Proposition 1. If instead the condition is not veriﬁed, so that there is a market and a price that
attracts only good entrepreneurs, then only these entrepreneurs deviate to that market and the
original allocation cannot be an equilibrium.
Starting from the separating allocation of Proposition 1, any market (b  b ) ∈ Ω that attracts
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so that bad entrepreneurs also prefer to deviate and issue promises in market (b  b ) instead of





. Hence, the separating allocation of Proposition 1 is an equilibrium
of the economy. That it is the unique separating equilibrium follows immediately from the fact
that — starting from any other feasible separating allocation — good entrepreneurs strictly prefer to





at a price of (∗) = .
316.1.2 Pooling Equilibria (Proposition 2)
To show that the allocations of Proposition 2 are competitive equilibria, we invoke the same rea-
soning used to prove Proposition 1, which we therefore do not reproduce. It is straightforward to
verify that any market (b  b ) ∈ Ω in which the price of promises (   )attracts good entrepreneurs
away from a pooling equilibrium will attract bad entrepreneurs as well. Hence, the presence of the
external agent in any such market can always be counterbalanced by bad entrepreneurs along the
sequence of -equilibria.
It remains to be shown that pooling allocations () in which   cannot be equilibria of
the economy. To do so, we argue that there always exists a combination of a market and a price
of promises that attracts only good entrepreneurs away from such allocations. Formally, consider
am a r k e t(e ) ∈ Ω in which the price of promises (  ) satisﬁes:
 ·
£
( ·  + ) − 
¤
+(  − )= ·
h
((  ) · e  + ) − e 
i
.
Clearly, such a market always exists. But since   , it follows that
 ·
£
( ·  + ) − 
¤
+(  − )   ·
h
((  ) · e  + ) − e 
i
.
These two conditions jointly imply that there is a price (  ) + ,f o r small enough, at which
only good entrepreneurs choose to abandon the pooling allocation () in order to borrow from
market (e ).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We have already argued that any competitive equilibrium must entail pooling in all active unmon-
itored markets. Hence, the use of these markets can only be welfare-enhancing for good entrepre-
neurs if there is a separating equilibrium in monitored markets: otherwise, entrepreneurs would
be issuing promises in both sets of markets at the same price and nothing fundamental would be
changed by the presence of unmonitored borrowing.
If there is a separating equilibrium in monitored markets, the eﬀect of unmonitored borrow-
ing is to increase entrepreneurial wealth  thereby allowing good entrepreneurs to expand their
incentive-compatible level of investment. To see this, we can write the proﬁts of good entrepreneurs
32as
Π =  ·
h
( · ∗
()+ · ) − (∗
+ )
i
.( 2 2 )
The notation ∗
() illustrates that the number of promises that good entrepreneurs can issue












+  · ( − ).( 2 3 )
To see whether the proﬁt of good entrepreneurs increases or not by expanding  we can diﬀeren-
tiate Equation (22) to obtain:
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denotes the change in ∗
that preserves the equality in the incentive compatibility
constraint of Equation (23) as  changes. Equation (24) captures the eﬀect of unmonitored
borrowing on the proﬁts of good entrepreneurs: (i) on the one hand, the direct marginal eﬀect
of unmonitored borrowing is given by  · (0(·) ·  − 1), which is potentially negative; (ii) on the
other hand, there is an additional indirect eﬀect because this borrowing enables good entrepreneurs






promises in monitored markets at a price of .T a k i n gt h i si n t o
account, Equation (24) can be written as
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 0,( 2 6 )
so that the marginal beneﬁt of issuing promises in unmonitored markets is positive and constant
up to the point at which the total investment of good entrepreneurs reaches its eﬃcient level of
∗∗
.
Among the set of equilibria that entail separation in monitored markets and pooling in un-
monitored ones, the allocation characterized in the Proposition thus maximizes the welfare of good
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for  ∈ Ω  6= ∗
,
where ∗
 is deﬁned as in Equation (14). These prices satisfy Equation (15) and they make bad
entrepreneurs indiﬀerent between (i) borrowing from all unmonitored markets and defaulting and
(ii) borrowing from markets ∗





∈ Ω and investing ∗∗
. Hence, these
prices can clearly be obtained as the limit of -equilibria in which bad entrepreneurs are arbitrarily
assigned to either option. Given our previous arguments, good entrepreneurs ﬁnd it optimal to
borrow from the only active unmonitored market. Finally, lenders break even in each market and
thus have no incentive to modify their portfolio. Of course, this equilibrium exists if and only if
bad entrepreneurs do not default on their unmonitored promises, so that ∗
 ≤ 
.
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